Possible UAP behavioral patterns unveiled by a new study
On 20 April 2026, Scientific Coalition for UAP studies published a study examining UAP activity in the military and public sectors in the continental United States from 1945 to 1975
Titled ‘UAP Operational Presence, 1945–1975’, the study focuses on assessing the behaviour of UAPs and the resource constraints they faced.
Drawing on Sparks’ database of ‘unknown’ cases from Project Blue Book, supplementary archives from NICAP, and four previous SCU publications, the study’s authors — Ian M. Porritt, Larry J. Hancock, and Sean Grosvenor — analysed a total of 1,163 UAP reports.
Ian M. Porritt is a Massey University graduate. He specialises in analysing technical data for research and development purposes. He contributes his expertise to various organisations, including the SCU, and is collaborating on the Galileo project. Larry Hancock graduated from the University of New Mexico with degrees in history and cultural anthropology. He has conducted research and written books on the history of the Cold War and national security issues. He has spent his career in technical education, IT, communications and technology marketing. Sean Grosvenor is a forensic consultant and a former member of the Illinois State Police. He advises several organisations on investigations and intelligence assessment and has been involved in efforts to study advanced forms of non-human intelligence.
The authors aimed to identify behavioural patterns, operational rhythms, and potential resource constraints associated with the presence of non-human intelligences (NHI).
While these databases list cases that remain unexplained after conventional explanations have been ruled out, this does not necessarily mean that every report reflects the involvement of NHIs. The authors therefore focused on patterns that recurred across numerous cases, comparing them with concepts drawn from strategic analysis and human intelligence, such as the logic of reconnaissance, operational constraints, and deployment patterns.
For methodological clarity, the possibility of undisclosed human technology is not treated as a viable explanatory model. Between 1945 and 1975, no state possessed the propulsion physics, deployment reach, or operational consistency required to account for the observed signatures.
Strategic Focus on Nuclear Infrastructure
The data show that during the early years of the nuclear weapons programme and missile and aircraft testing, the small number of US military installations involved in atomic warfare recorded UAP activity that was four to eight times higher than that of all other military sites combined. While this was not the sole focus of UAP activity, this trend continued in subsequent years.
The study identifies several multi‑day activity surges coinciding with major U.S. atomic warfare developments, including 1949–1951 (atomic weapons facility expansion), 1952 (national wave), 1957 (ICBM deployment), and the October–November 1975 Northern Tier incidents.
A Small, Resource‑Constrained Reconnaissance Presence
During these periods of increased activity, the available data shows no clear evidence of sustained and simultaneous operations across multiple sites. Even when several incidents are reported on the same day, the reports are often separated by several hours and great distances.
If a larger concurrent multi-site operation had been underway, even if many went unobserved, the resulting pattern would differ markedly from the tightly sequenced, single-site progression that appears in the record. A concurrent operation, even under low observability, would be expected to produce at least some overlapping or partially simultaneous activity across facilities.
Across the 11,322 days in the 1945–1975 study period curated data set, only 27 days showed more than two U.S. military-related reports occurring on the same day, and only seven days exceeded three.
The 1975 Northern Tier events — spanning 27 October to 12 November and involving four strategic atomic warfare facilities — provide the clearest example: UAP activity progressed in a staggered sequence from one site to the next rather than appearing at multiple locations simultaneously.
The activities of the UAPs are characterised by a constant presence interspersed with short periods of planned intensification. This contradicts the hypothesis of a sustained, large-scale presence, suggesting instead that they are a small, mobile reconnaissance force operating with limited resources.
However, the authors point out that this apparent restraint should not be taken as an indication of their full potential capability or benevolent intentions. It may simply reflect their current limited resources.
Behavioral Adaptation Over Time
By the mid-1960s, UAP operations had shifted from highly visible manoeuvres in broad daylight in the late 1940s to predominantly night-time and low-visibility operations.
UAP operations transitioned from highly visible daylight maneuvers in the late 1940s to predominantly nocturnal, lower‑visibility profiles by the mid‑1960s.
This trend is very clear. Manoeuvres carried out in broad daylight accounted for over 60 per cent of reports between 1945 and 1949. However, this figure declined steadily, accounting for just 5 per cent of PAN activity by 1975.
Notably, UAP lights went dark whenever interceptors approached and reacted once the aircraft departed. This behavior implies the lighting was deliberate control and either designed to allow themselves to be ‘seen’ in a limited way, illumination was mission-critical (the task required it) or craft-dependent (the operation of the craft requires it), yet switchable to evade detection. […]
Whether the illumination served a mission function or was intended to signal presence, the behavior implies that UAP visibility is selective, not passive. The operators allowed themselves to be seen at a distance yet avoided close engagement, consistent with both a controlled presentation of visibility (or an unavoidable presentation of visibility) and a clear reluctance to be intercepted.
Selective visibility control appears to indicate both operational restraint and potential vulnerability. However, history of military engagements suggests that UAPs appear to be able to avoid harm even under attack. This suggests that some other concern is in play regarding the long-term shift to more nighttime operations.
Coordinated Intelligence Behavior
During peak activity periods, reports span multiple states and air defense sectors, suggesting a pattern of coordinated reconnaissance rather than isolated anomalies. In other cases, reports involve multiple objects or formation flight, indicating coordinated group activity, though still confined to one region at a time.
The absence of broad geographic saturation or daily simultaneous incursions argues against a largescale, sustained presence. Although limited concurrency cannot be ruled out, the lack of clear multi-site overlap, even during the busiest national waves, strongly reinforces the assessment that NHI operations were likely conducted at a modest scale, expressed through staggered, region-to-region movements rather than broad parallel coverage.
Consistent monthly report counts and observed staged development further support a continuous operational presence. Despite diversity in reported NHI descriptions, the stability of behavioral patterns across indicators suggests coordination by a single operant group rather than multiple independent actors.
Long‑Duration Operational Continuity
The authors of the study argue that the factors identified — small-scale deployment, likely resource constraints, a continuous presence spanning three decades and rapid withdrawal in the face of interference — would require a stable operational base.
Together, these strands of evidence indicate a near-continuous yet low-intensity deployment: a stealthy, cyclical rhythm of mobile assets from a local hub or covert base.
A specific behavioural pattern?
This study is limited to operations carried out on the mainland territory of the United States. The authors point out:
UAP activity during 1945–1975 was also reported globally, in Europe, South America, and elsewhere, and simultaneous activity in other regions could indicate a larger global deployment capacity than is visible in the U.S. subset. While not included as part of this study, independent analyses of the 1954 European UAP wave (e.g., Vallée 1969; Michel 1958; Clarke 2015; Ballester Olmos) consistently describe a sequential, region-by-region progression rather than broad concurrent activity.
Sightings intensified in one area for several days before diminishing and reappearing elsewhere, a structure consistent with staggered deployments rather than simultaneous multi-zone operations. However, no global assessment has been made to determine if global region-to-region reports are staggered or concurrent, this additional assessment will increase our understanding of the wider operational presence.
The authors therefore acknowledge that only a large-scale, global study covering several time periods spread over several years or decades would be able to reveal:
Long-term trends in deployment intensity
Shifts in geographic focus
Whether NHI may favor permanent bases or fly-in/fly-out mission profiles
This approach would provide a strong framework for assessing the scope, pacing, and evolution of UAP activity. It also enables analysts to distinguish between localized reconnaissance, global monitoring, and strategic engagement patterns, critical for evaluating resource commitment and operational intent.
Such a study would require the creation of a curated and harmonized global UAP database, rich in metadata, standardized classifications, and precise timestamps. It would enable analysts to confirm the behavioral pattern observed in the United States or to reveal a different operational profile.
About the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies (SCU):
The Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies is a nonprofit interdisciplinary research organization dedicated to the scientific investigation of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). SCU is composed of scientists, engineers, former military and intelligence professionals, and law enforcement experts.