2026 NDAA "directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees"
A preliminary version of the US military spending bill suggests that Congress is attempting to enhance its oversight of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).
This text, first reported by D.D. Johnson, is just one of the initial steps in establishing the NDAA for 2026, setting out the proposals and recommendations made by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Nevertheless, the fact that UAP is referenced at such an early stage, even before the specific declassification law 'UAPDA', is an indication of the interest held by elected representatives in the phenomenon.
NORAD
Sec. 1555—Briefings on intercepts of unidentified anomalous phenomena by North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1683(l) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to include a new element for the semi-annual briefing requirement to include details on any unidentified anomalous phenomena intercepts conducted by the North American Aerospace Defense Command or U.S. Northern Command.
The fact that NORAD, responsible for surveillance of both Canadian and US airspace, is now tasked with briefing the committee specifically on UAPs may stem from President Biden's decision to shoot down unidentified objects in North American skies in February 2023 :
For decades, our nations enjoyed the benefits of dominant military capabilities in all domains and we relied on our geography to serve as a barrier to keep our nations beyond the reach of most conventional threats.
However, our competitors have analyzed our ability to operate overseas and have invested in capabilities such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, small unmanned aircraft systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and delivery platforms to offset our strengths while exploiting our perceived weaknesses.
U.S. Northern Command Strategic Environment
These objects are still unknown today, while the NORAD admits it tracks thousands of “uncorrelated targets” each year, and conducts intercepts.
SECRECY
Sec. 1556—Consolidated security classification guidance matrix for programs relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director for the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office to issue a consolidated security classification guidance matrix for programs relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena. The provision also requires the Director to provide a briefing on the implementation of the security guidance matrix to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 30 days after the issuance of the consolidated security guidance matrix.
For years, numerous officials have complained that the administration's excessive secrecy could lead to a risk of strategic surprise due to a lack of information transfer between US agencies. Even 24 years after 9/11, it seems that the US is still keen to limit the transfer of information regarding certain 'sensitive' topics. One can only wonder why.
It is my view that deficiencies in the current classification system undermine our national security
Former US director of national intelligence, Avril Haines
DEP SEC DEF BRIEFINGS
The committee directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2026, on the strategic vision for the AARO across the Future Years Defense Plan. The briefing shall include:
(1) Priority focus areas for the next 5 years;
(2) Identification of elements within the Department that may have capabilities or activities that could provide support to the AARO mission;
(3) Anticipated challenges during the next 5 years;
(4) Projected budgets for the next 5 years that allow the AARO to continue its role in addressing UAP reports;
(5) A description of any plans to cease, modify, or transition to another element of the Department the responsibilities of the AARO over the next 5 years; and
(6) Any other such topics related to long-term AARO activities the Deputy Secretary deems appropriate.
If the text seems to reiterate the importance of AARO, the fact that the DEPSECDEF must now present its work could be seen as reinforcing Congressional control over AARO. This is because it will also have to brief the DSD on its activities before the DSD can report them to Congress.
The sixth element is puzzling. While the FBI is trying to convince representatives to hand over AARO's mission and funding, the NDAA's stipulation that any transfer must be reported and that a 5 years-plan must be established seem to consolidate AARO's role.
DETECTION
Integrated sensing roadmap for unidentified anomalous phenomena
The committee is also aware that the AARO has been investing in a set of sensors focused on airborne UAPs, but, as noted in its annual report to Congress, gaps still exist in the sensing of space, maritime surface, and maritime subsurface domains. Additionally, the ability to correlate data from these domains into a single picture for analysis by the AARO does not currently exist. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the AARO to develop an integrated sensing roadmap and to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than August 1, 2026. Such roadmap should include the following:
(1) A framework for sensing needs and gaps for space, maritime surface, and maritime subsurface domains;
(2) An assessment of available sensors for each of those domains;
(3) Challenges to developing an integrated picture across those domains;
(4) The ability to integrate sympathetic collection of other sensors available during data collection events; and
(5) An assessment of resources needed to address any gaps or challenges identified by the roadmap.
As previously reported by Sentinel News, AARO's official strategic plan encompasses far more than simply collecting military testimonies. One such aspect is the detection of UAPs, their recovery, and their reverse engineering.
Intriguingly, only the detection stage of the process is mentioned here. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see the Senate Armed Committee supporting instrumental research on UAP.
There is still a long road ahead for the NDAA and its UAP provisions. The UAPDA has yet to be included, but one might question whether the increased congressional support for the AARO is intended to prevent the formation of a UAP declassification committee for the third time.